GitHub Actions: from build to verified release
This tutorial walks through a full attested CI pipeline using aflock-ai/cilock-action, six steps (lint, SAST, test, build, SBOM, docker-build) each producing signed in-toto attestations via OIDC. The pattern below follows TestifySec's reference implementation at github.com/testifysec/dropbox-clone.
What you'll build
A pipeline where every step is wrapped by cilock-action and produces a signed attestation. All signing is keyless (Fulcio + GitHub OIDC), all attestations are timestamped by the platform's TSA (<platform-url>/api/v1/timestamp), and all evidence is uploaded to Archivista using OIDC for auth, no static API keys.
Prerequisites
-
A GitHub repo (this tutorial assumes a Go project, but any language works)
-
Permission to add workflow files
-
The evidence destination your administrator approved. Every step below signs with the platform's Fulcio and uploads its evidence to the platform's Archivista, both derived from
platform-url. Before you run it, get from your administrator:- the exact
https://platform origin: the hosted platform, or your private or self-hosted deployment; - the tenant, and the product this repository's evidence belongs to, already set up there;
- confirmation that this repository is allowed to sign and upload to it.
Store the origin as the repository variable
CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL. The workflow refuses to run without it. If you omitplatform-urlentirely, cilock-action does not stop: it defaults to the hosted platform,https://platform.testifysec.com, and uploads there (enable-archivistadefaults totrue). Name the destination on purpose instead of relying on that default. - the exact
Step 1: Set the right permissions
Cilock-action needs id-token: write to request the OIDC token used by Fulcio (signing) and Archivista (upload). It needs contents: read for checkout. Nothing else.
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: readThis is the same minimum set TestifySec uses in cilock-action-oidc.yaml.
Step 2: The six-step attested pipeline
name: cilock-action OIDC attestations
on:
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches: [main]
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
jobs:
attest:
name: Attested CI Pipeline
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# 0. Declare the destination before anything is uploaded. Fails the job
# when the repository variable is unset or not an https origin, and
# prints where this run's evidence will go.
- name: Check the evidence destination
env:
PLATFORM_URL: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
run: |
case "$PLATFORM_URL" in
https://*) ;;
*) echo "::error::Set the CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL repository variable to your administrator-approved https platform origin"; exit 1 ;;
esac
echo "Evidence for this run is signed and uploaded to: $PLATFORM_URL"
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@d35c59abb061a4a6fb18e82ac0862c26744d6ab5 # v5.5.0
with:
# syft v1.54.1 needs Go 1.26.8 or later to install.
go-version: "1.26"
# Pinned tool versions, installed through the Go module proxy and
# checksum database rather than a script fetched from a moving branch.
- name: Install syft
run: go install github.com/anchore/syft/cmd/[email protected]
- name: Install gosec
run: go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/[email protected]
# 1. Lint + secret scan
- name: lint + secrets
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
with:
step: lint
command: echo "lint passed"
attestations: environment git github secretscan
platform-url: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
# 2. SAST: gosec writes SARIF, captured as a product. -no-fail keeps
# cilock's command-run attestor green when gosec reports findings;
# the policy gate is the Rego over the captured SARIF, not the
# tool's exit code.
- name: sast
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
with:
step: sast
command: gosec -no-fail -fmt=sarif -out=gosec-results.sarif ./...
attestations: environment git github sarif
platform-url: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
product-include-glob: "*.sarif"
# 3. Tests
- name: test
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
with:
step: test
command: go test -count=1 ./...
attestations: environment git github
platform-url: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
# 4. Build the binary — cilock observes the compiler's exact argv
# via command-run; bin/myapp lands in product/v0.3 as a Merkle
# leaf. This is the artifact the SBOM step (next) will scan.
- name: build
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
env:
CGO_ENABLED: "0"
with:
step: build
command: go build -o bin/myapp ./cmd/myapp
attestations: environment git github
platform-url: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
product-include-glob: "bin/*"
# 5. SBOM the build's output — separate cilock step so syft's argv
# is its own command-run, the build artifact is recorded as
# material/v0.3 (because cilock hashes the working tree before
# syft runs), and the SBOM lands in product/v0.3. A release-gate
# Rego policy can then check that the SBOM's targeted file digest
# matches the build step's product.
- name: sbom
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
with:
step: sbom
command: syft bin/myapp -o cyclonedx-json=bin/bom.cdx.json
attestations: environment git github sbom
platform-url: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
product-include-glob: "bin/*"
# 6. Container build
- name: docker-build
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
with:
step: docker-build
command: docker buildx build --metadata-file docker-metadata.json -t myapp:test --load .
attestations: environment git github docker
platform-url: ${{ vars.CILOCK_PLATFORM_URL }}
product-include-glob: "docker-metadata.json"Every uses: is pinned to a full commit SHA, with the release tag in a comment, and each tool is installed at a fixed version. A tag or @latest can be moved after you review the workflow; a commit SHA cannot.
Why each step uses the attestor mix it does
| Step | Extra attestor | Why |
|---|---|---|
lint | secretscan | Cheap to run on a no-op command, catches credentials accidentally echoed during real lint output. |
sast | sarif | The output is a SARIF file; the SARIF attestor parses it into structured findings inside the attestation. |
test | (none) | Test runs primarily need command-run + git + CI context. |
build | (none) | command-run records the compiler's argv, and bin/myapp lands in the product attestation. |
sbom | sbom | A separate step, so syft's argv is its own command-run and the build output is recorded as a material before syft reads it. |
docker-build | docker | The docker attestor parses the buildx metadata file and records image digests. |
environment, git, and github are passed to every step, this gives you the source commit, runner identity, and CI context on every attestation, so verification policy can match identity claims per step.
What gets produced
Each step produces a signed DSSE envelope containing an in-toto Collection. With enable-archivista: true (the cilock-action default), each envelope is also pushed to the Archivista derived from platform-url (the origin the preflight step printed) using a fresh OIDC token. The attestation_file and git_oid action outputs let downstream steps reference the evidence:
- name: docker-build
id: docker
uses: aflock-ai/cilock-action@d39bb9b17e392520f9e7eef17cf355c027a5c283 # v1.0.4
with:
step: docker-build
# ...
- name: Print evidence GitOID
env:
GIT_OID: ${{ steps.docker.outputs.git_oid }}
run: echo "Evidence stored at $GIT_OID"Adding a verification gate
To make this enforce policy (not just observe), add a separate job that runs cilock verify against a signed policy after all attested steps complete. See Verify in a release gate for the gate pattern.
Going further
- Need the raw CLI? TestifySec's
test-staging-cilock.yamlshows a similar pipeline usingcilock rundirectly instead of the action, useful for understanding what the action does under the hood. It is a development recipe: it uploads to a TestifySec staging environment. Read it for the commands; do not copy its destination into a production workflow. - Two-pipeline architecture. The repo also splits CI (
ci.yaml, PR-triggered,contents: read) from CD (deploy.yaml, push-triggered, full AWS credentials via OIDC federation). This is the "two pipelines, two trust boundaries" pattern; CI/lock is the proof that the boundary holds. - Defending against real attacks. See Defending against supply-chain attacks for how the layers above stop the Trivy and LiteLLM compromises.
Reference generated from the product documentation. Match commands and support details to your installed release.